Inspired by Minority Games, we constructed a novel individual-level game of adaptive decision-making based on the dilemma of deciding whether to participate in voluntary influenza vaccination programs. The proportion of the population vaccinated (i.e., the vaccination coverage) determines epidemic severity.
Introduction
Since the influenza vaccine is effective for one year, individuals must decide every year whether to participate in voluntary vaccination programs (1) . The proportion of the population vaccinated, p (i.e., the vaccination coverage) determines epidemic severity (2) . Above a critical vaccination coverage p c , epidemics are prevented; hence individuals find it unnecessary to vaccinate. Individuals that vaccinate protect themselves from infection. If they do not vaccinate they may still avoid infection if sufficient numbers of their peers vaccinate (i.e., through herd immunity). This poses a yearly dilemma (i.e., the vaccinee's dilemma) for the individual of whether vaccination is necessary. An individual's strategy for making yearly decisions may be an adaptive process of trial and error based on their decision making experience (i.e., using inductive reasoning). We model the adaptive dynamics of vaccination decisions in a population of non-communicating individuals acting in their own self-interest trying to avoid infection preferably without vaccinating. We track individual-level decisions and population-level variables; specifically, yearly vaccination coverage and prevalence f (i.e., the proportion of the population infected during an influenza season). We address the fol-
lowing question: Can an ensemble of individuals self-organize to prevent influenza epidemics by yearly voluntary vaccination?
Mean-field influenza transmission models (based on ordinary differential equations) have explored the epidemiological effects of treatment (3), drug resistance (4), multiple strains (5) , and virulence (6) at the population-level. Spatial data have been used to forecast influenza epidemics (7) , and investigate synchronization between epidemics (8). In the past decade, Minority Games (9) have attracted much attention in statistical mechanics and fi-3 nance. Minority Games model the behavior of adaptive individuals within a collective that compete for the benefit of being in a minority. Inspired by Minority Games, we constructed an individual-level game of adaptive vaccination decision making. Our individual-level game includes the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model (see Supplementary Methods Appendix A) to determined whether the critical vaccination coverage necessary to prevent influenza epidemics is likely to be reached. Previously, games have been used to price vaccines (10) and predict voluntary vaccination coverage for pathogens that provide permanent immunity (e.g., smallpox or measles) (11) . These games are based on deductive reasoning. For pathogens that provide permanent immunity, deductive reasoning can be used because individuals need to get vaccinated only once. In the case of influenza, individuals do not acquire permanent immunity and need to make vaccination decisions every year. Thus, it may be assumed that individuals make decisions based on their past experiences (i.e., use inductive reasoning) rather than based only on the current epidemiology (i.e., use deductive reasoning). In contrast to previous work, our model is an inductive reasoning game. The central concept of our model is that the adaptive dynamics of the vaccination decisions directly affect influenza epidemiology and, conversely, influenza epidemiology strongly influences decision-making.
Results
We find that influenza epidemics cannot be prevented in most seasons if individuals make decisions based upon inductive reasoning and voluntary vaccination (Fig. 1A) . When epidemics occur, some individuals get infected and hence increase their vaccination probability for the next season; thus, p approaches p c (Fig. 1A) . Eventually, the coverage slightly exceeds p c due to the stochastic nature of the individual-level vaccination decisions and an epidemic is prevented. Next season, many individuals decide that there is no need for vaccination; thus p abruptly decreases and a severe epidemic ensues. (This effect resembles the occurrence of crashes in financial markets (19) due to sudden loss of public confidence in the stock exchange.) Coverage then repeats similar dynamics (Fig. 1A) . Yearly prevalence peaks every time coverage drops substantially below p c , rapidly decreasing in successive years as coverage increases (Fig. 1A) . If initial coverage is larger than p c then p will drop below p c within a few years (results not shown). Coverage then follows similar dynamics to that illustrated in Fig. 1A . The feedback mechanism between the influenza epidemiology and the adaptive dynamics of the decision making creates a unique self-organized state where epidemics are prevented. This state is attracting, but unstable; thus epidemics are rarely prevented. This result implies that vaccination will have to be mandatory if the public health objective is to prevent influenza epidemics. In the Supplementary Methods, we show the fixed point analysis and derive the expected periodicity of the coverage dynamics.
The dynamics of each individual's vaccination probability is more complex than coverage dynamics (Fig. 1B) . Figure 1C 
Discussion
In the United States (US), demand for influenza vaccines is generally met and no major shortages occur. In recent years, coverage (based upon voluntary vaccination) has steadily increased (13, 14) . One of the national health objectives of the US is to increase the coverage (13, 14) that is currently below the Healthy People 2010 objectives (15) . We found com-plex epidemic dynamics can occur simply due to individuals making voluntary vaccination decisions. We deliberately did not include variation in strain virulence because we wanted to assess the impact of voluntary vaccination on pathogen dynamics. Notably, we found large influenza epidemics could occur without the introduction of virulent pandemic strains. Furthermore, the critical coverage level is unlikely to be reached if vaccination is voluntary.
We also found that certain public health programs could be detrimental. Previous studies have shown that vaccinating above the critical coverage level would always be worthwhile. In contrast, we paradoxically found that a coverage level higher than the critical level could be problematic. This perverse result occurs because inductively reasoning individuals evaluate vaccination as unnecessary if the critical coverage level was exceeded in the previous season.
The severity of the subsequent influenza epidemic depends upon the degree to which the critical coverage was exceeded.
We used a novel individual-level inductive reasoning game model to obtain insight into the impact of individual-level vaccination decisions on influenza epidemiology. We found that critical vaccination coverage levels will rarely be reached; hence influenza epidemics will only occasionally be prevented. This result implies that vaccination will have to be mandatory if 
Methods
In the past decade, inductive reasoning systems have been modeled using Minority Games We model the effect of memory by using a parameter s to discount the previous seasons' vaccination outcome with respect to the outcome of the present season (0 < s < 1).
Specifically, V 
ǫ describes the adaptability with respect to experience with vaccination (0 < ǫ < 1).
In our model, the probability of an unvaccinated individual acquiring influenza q(p) (branch (a)) will judge their decision depending on whether there was an influenza epidemic that season. If p ≥ p c (branch (a1)), they will conclude that getting vaccinated that season was not necessary to prevent infection. Otherwise, if p < p c (branch (a2)), they will conclude that their decision was beneficial for avoiding infection that season. An individual that decides not to vaccinate that season (branch (b)) will judge their decision based on whether or not they were infected. If they did get infected (branch (b1)) they will conclude that their decision of not vaccinating was detrimental and that vaccination was necessary for avoiding infection. Instead, if by chance they avoided infection (branch (b2)), they will conclude that vaccination was not necessary. B: The probability of getting infected with influenza q(p)
versus the vaccination coverage p. 
